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THE INDIGENT TENANT AND THE DOCTRINE
OF CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION
INTRODUCTION
In its report, President Johnson's National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, more popularly know~m as the "Riot Commission,"
stated:
Today, after more than three decades of fragmented and grossly
under-funded Federal housing programs, decent housing remains
a chronic problem for the disadvantaged urban household. Fifty-
six percent of the country's nonwhite families live in central cities
today, and of these, nearly two-thirds live in neighborhoods
marked by substandard housing and general urban blight. For
these citizens, condemned by segregation and poverty to live in
the decaying slums of our central cities, the goal of a decent home
and suitable environment is as far distant as ever.'
The Commission also summarized some of the reasons for the snow-
balling phenomenon of the ghetto housing:
The reasons many Negroes live in decaying slums are not diffi-
cult to discover. First and foremost is poverty. Most ghetto resi-
dents cannot pay the rent necessary to support decent housing.2
This prevents private builders from constructing new units in the
ghettos or from rehabilitating old ones, for either action involves
an investment that would require substantially higher rents than
most ghetto dwellers can pay. It also deters landlords from main-
taining units that are presently structurally sound. Maintenance
too requires additional investment, and at the minimal rents that
inner-city Negroes can pay, landlords have little incentive to pro-
vide it.3
While the role of poverty in fostering slum conditions can scarcely
be overestimated, its role has been exacerbated in certain major res-
pects by outmoded principles of property law. The law of landlord and
tenant has for many decades had to tolerate antiquated and rusty doc-
trines and must necessarily share some measure of the blame for the
1. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIvl. DISORDERS 257 (1968).
2. Howexer, in relation to their income, the Commission found that the slum tenant
was paying more for his housing than was the case outside the ghetto; also it was found
that less defective, more inexpensive lodging was often available for rent outside the
ghetto but denied to the Negro because of his race. Id. at 258-259.
3. Id. at 259.
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conditions described by the Riot Commission. It would, of course, be
both unfair and inaccurate to deny that there have been important
changes in this area of the law. Perhaps the most significant is the doc-
trine of constructive eviction by which a tenant can reject, like a defec-
tive chattel, the property he has leased. But new and far-reaching
changes are desperately needed to solve the problems of the slums. One
of the most pressing of these problems is the ineffectiveness of the
doctrine of constructive eviction in the hands of the ghetto inhabitant.
It is the purpose of this note to examine the doctrine of constructive
eviction, its origin, its scope, and the conditions necessitating its
modification.
I. THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP AT COMMON LAW
A. Historical Background
1. The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
It has been recently asserted that "to find a similarity between a
feudal lord's fief and a cold water flat in a contemporary American
city seems an anachronistic comparison."4 Nevertheless, as new law
students discover each year, often with astonishment, the heavy hand of
the medieval past has a crushing grip on the "modern" law of real
property in this country. In the words of one text writer, "landlord-
tenant law suffers severely from senility."5, Unfortunately, as will be
shown below, it is the urban slum dwellers who suffers most from the
persistence of this senile heritage.
The common law viewed the lease as a conveyance of reality for a
term.6 Along with the benefits of "ownership" of the property, the
tenant also assumed its obligations and liabilities. As the tenant was
legally in control of the premises, he, not the landlord, was responsible
for its maintenance. Recognized as a conveyance of realty, with the
rent regarded as the purchase price, the premises were leased subject
to the same principle applied to the sale of a freehold interest in prop-
4. Note, Rent Withholding-A Proposal for Change in Ohio, 18 Wrs. RES. L. REv.
1705, 1707 (1967).
5. J. CRBaET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, 181 (1962).
6. See, e.g., Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809); Warner v. Fry, 360 Mo. 496, 499, 228
S.W.2d 729, 730 (1950); Swingler v. Robinson, 321 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). See
also W. HoivSWoRTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION To THE LANDLAW, 230-355 (1927);
H. LFsAR, LANDLORD AND TENANT, § 3.38 (1957) [hereinafter cited as LEsAR]; C. MOYNIHAN,
INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 69-73 (1962).
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erty, i. e., the doctrine of caveat emptor. The doctrine is well stated by
Fowler v. Bott, the leading early case:
a lease for years is a sale of the demised premises for the term;
and, unless in the case of an express stipulation for the purpose,
the lessor does not insure the premises against inevitable accidents
or any other deterioration.7
In the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, therefore, land-
lords were not compelled to deliver possession of the premises in a
safe and sanitary condition, the tenant taking the property "as is."
Similarly, the lessor was under no duty to repair any defects which
occurred while the tenant was in posession.9 And if a demised building
was destroyed by fire or other casualty, the tenant nevertheless remained
liable for the payment of the rent reserved in the lease.10 Even if the
7. Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63, 67 (1809). See also authorities cited in note 6 supra. An
elception is made in some jurisdictions for short term leases of furnished houses on the
theory that no ample opportunity to inspect the premises was afforded the lessee prior
to occupancy. And in at least one case, a court has held that when the premises are
leased for short terms for immediate occupancy, there is an implied warranty of fitness
regardless of whether the premises were furnished. Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn.
428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931), noted in 16 MINN. L. REv. 445 (1932). In addition, in many
jurisdictions, there is a duty on the lessor to inform the tenant of defects which are not
discoverable by reasonable inspection of the premises. Failure of the landlord to apprise
the tenant of such conditions, if known by the landlord, permits the tenant to rescind
the lease and in some cases maintain an action for damages based on fraud. See generally,
LvsAR, § 3.45. In recent years, several courts have gone much further, and declared that
in every lease there is an implied warranty of habitability, giving as reasons those stated
by the Wisconsin court in Pines v. Perssion:
To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in
our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing
standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in this
era of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that obnoxious
legal cliche, caveat emptor. Permitting landlords to rent "tumble-down" houses is at
least a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency,
and high property taxes for conscientious landowners.
14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961). See also Schoshinski, Remedies of the
Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519, 523, 527 (1966).
8. See authorities cited note 7 supra.
9. See LzsMR § 3.78 and cases cited therein; 2 R. PowEuL, REAL PROPERTY 233 (P.
Rohan ed. 1967). While the lessor was under no such duty, the tenant was under an
obligation to the landlord to make such repairs as necessary to avoid liability for "per-
mimive waste." I H. TIFFANY, RAr.L PROPERTY § 102 (3d ed. 1939).
10. See, e.g., O'Neil v. Flanagan, 64 Mo. App. 87 (1895); Smith v. Kerr, 108 N.Y. 31, 15
NX. 70 (1888). Contra, Wattles v. South Omaha Ice & Coal Co., 50 Neb. 251, 69 N.W.
785 (1897). The theory behind this result was that the tenant is the "owner" of the
premises and must bear the risks thereof. See notes 6, 7 and accompanying text supra.
Similarly, the courts rationalized the rule on the presumption that the common law result
reflected the intention of the parties since, if the tenant did not care to assume the risk
of destruction, he might easily protect himself by an appropriate provision in the lease.
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condition of the premises resulted in condemnation by municipal
authorities,the tenant was not relieved of rent liability.1
The tenant was, of course, "free"' 2 to secure a covenant from the
landlord obligating the latter to assume the burden of repairing the
premises. Therefore, the courts reasoned with thoughtless confidence,
if the parties, being "free" men and standing on "equal terms""u did
not expressly require such a covenant in the lease, it was surely not
the function of the law to imply one. This deeply entrenched attitude
of the courts played a significant role in shaping the present landlord
law in this area. The invalidity of the "freedom of contract" presump-
tion, on which the attitude is largely founded, will be dealt with below.
2. Independent Covenants
Despite his vastly superior bargaining position, it is possible that
the landlord will covenant to make repairs independently of any coer-
cion to do so imposed by law. Having secured such a covenant, how-
ever, the tenant has only slightly improved his position. At common
law, covenants in a lease were recognized as being independent of
each other, and a breach of covenant by one party did not relieve the
other from his obligations under the lease.14 Thus, nonperformance by
the landlord of his covenant to repair or maintain the premises does
not relieve the tenant of his duty to pay rent.Yr The reasons given to
Because of the belief that the lessor is in a far better position to insure the premises
against such disasters, the common law has been modified and the risk of destruction
placed upon the lessor by modem statutes. See LSAR § 3.103, at n.8 and accompanying
text.
11. See Burnes v. Fuchs, 28 Mo. App. 279 (1887).
12. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text infra.
13. See Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding under New York's Spiegel
Law, 15 BuFF. L. Rv. 572, 575-576 (1966).
14. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 290 (1932); LESAR § 3.79; 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 909 (3d. ed. 1939). For an exhaustive annotation dealing with the rights of
the tenant on breach of the landlord's covenant to repair, see Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 446
(1953).
15. See, e.g., Frazier v. Riley, 215 Ala. 517, 111 So. 10 (1926); Ng v. Warren, 79 Cal.
App. 2d 54, 179 P.2d 41 (1947); Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So.
79 (1932); Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476 (1938). However, an executory
lease, wherein the lessor covenants to repair the premises prior to the tenant's possession,
may be rescinded by the tenant if the landlord fails to repair; see, e.g., Tuohy v. Novich,
230 S.W.2d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950); Rein v. Robert Metrik Co., 200 Misc. 231, 105
N.Y.S.2d 160 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Minster v. Pennsylvania Co., 104 Pa. Super. 301, 159 A. 465
(1932). Acceptance of the premises prior to repair, however, renders the tenant liable for
rent; see, e.g., Richard Paul, Inc. v. Union Improvement Co., 59 F. Supp. 252 (D. Del.
1945); Bankers Mtge. Co. v. Robson, 123 Kan. 746, 256 P. 997 (1927). The parties could,
of course, expressly provide that the landlord's failure to repair relieved the tenant of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1968/iss3/4
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support the doctrine of independent covenants as it applies to the
tenant's duty to pay rent are partly historical 16 and partly based on the
presumption that covenants for services are subsidiary in the landlord-
tenant relationship, and the breach of a promise to provide them can
be readily compensated by an action at law.' 7
3. Eviction and the Doctrine of Quiet Enjoyment
A major exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor is the covenant
of quiet enjoyment which is implied in all leases in the absence of ex-
press language to the contrary.' s Basically, where the covenant is im-
plied, the landlord warrants that he has an adequate title to the estate
created by the lease, and that he will permit the tenant to enjoy the
demised interest without disturbances or interruptions.' 9 The basic
purpose of the covenant for quiet enjoyment is to protect the tenant
from the lawful claims of third parties having title paramount to the
landlord as well as from any unlawful disturbances by the landlord or
persons acting through him of the tenant's possession.20
This was indeed a significant exception to the doctrine of indepen-
dent covenants and it was uniformly held that if the landlord or persons
acting through him, actually evicted the tenant, that is, deprived him
physically of the possession of a whole or substantial portion of the
demised premises,2' the tenant was thereby relieved of liability for
rent.2 -' To the early common law landlord, however, the problems
presented by the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment were far from
his liability for rent, but there is little doubt that few slum lords would enter into such
a lease.
16. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, comment to § 290 (1932); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
5 890 at 587-589 (3d ed. 1962). It might also be noted that the property law of indepen-
dent covenants became firmly established before the contract law of mutually dependent
promises was developed.
17. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Horan, 263 Mass. 302, 304, 160 N.E. 828, 829 (1928); Smithfield
Improvement Co. v. Coley-Bardin, 156 N.C. 255, 72 S.E. 312 (1911). See also Bennett, The
Modern Lease, 16 TEx. L. RaV. 47 (1937).
18. The cases are collected in Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1257 (1929). For a discussion of the
historical basis for the covenant of quiet enjoyment, see 7 W. HoLDswORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw, 253, 256-257 (2d ed. 1937); 3 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY, § 1129 (Replace-
ment ed. 1959).
19. See cases cited in Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1257 (1929).
20. Id.
21. For a comprehensive collection of acts constituting actual eviction, see 1 J. RAcfC,
LANDLORD AND TENANT AND SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS, §§ 850-870 (1950).
22. See LESAR, § 3.52. In addition to the suspension of rent, the lessee may also sue
for damages for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, or even secure restoration of
his possession; id. if 3.49, 3.52.
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insurmountable. So long as the landlord did not physically oust the
tenant, the latter remained liable for rent, and "no offensive or out-
rageous conduct on the part of the landlord, as by erecting a nuisance
in the neighbourhood of the demised premises, will be sufficient" to
release the tenant from his liability.23
This, of course, presented grave problems for the tenant. Conduct
on the part of the landlord, such as failure to repair or provide heat,
might render the premises utterly uninhabitable, yet so long as the
lessor did not deny possession to the tenant, there was no eviction and
no cessation of rent liability.
Such a state of affairs soon became unacceptable, even to the early
common law judges. While it was apparently out of the question to
suggest anything so radical as a modification of the view that posses-
sion of the property was the primary consideration of the landlord-
tenant relationship, the courts were persuaded to liberalize the actual
eviction requirement. Thus the link with the past was preserved, but
the law was drastically changed by the emergence of a fiction, the doc-
trine of constructive eviction.
B. The Doctrine of Constructive Eviction
1. Origin of the Doctrine
The departure from the old law is perhaps best demonstrated by the
leading case of Dyett v. Pendleton.24 The tenant had leased a portion
of a house into which the landlord introduced prostitutes. The tenant
and his family abandoned the premises, testifying that the noises in-
cidental to their new neighbors' trade kept them from sleeping and
forced them to seek new lodging. In an action by the landlord for
rent the trial court foind no physical eviction, and thus, bound by long
and deep-rooted precedent, held the tenant liable. On appeal, the case
was reversed, the court holding that "other acts of the landlord going to
diminish the enjoyment of the premises, besides an actual expulsion,
will exonerate [the tenant] from the payment of rent."2 The dissenting
members of the court were not unaware of the significance of the major-
ity opinion. One of the more farsighted faced the issue squarely, asking
himself: might a tenant abandon the premises and be exonerated from
the payment of rent because the misconduct of the lessor has disturbed
23. 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARMS ON AMERICAN LAiW, 464 (2d ed. 1832).
24. 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826).
25. Id. at 732.
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his enjoyment of the premises? Then he described the parade of hor-
ribles which would result from the majority's answer to this question:
If this question were to be answered in the affirmative, it would...
introduce a new and very extensive chapter in the law of landlord
and tenant; for if the encouragement or practice of lewdness on
premises under the same roof with the tenements leased, would
warrant an abdication by the tenant, and release him from his
covenant to pay rent, there is no reason why, if the landlord should
by any other means render the occupation of the premises incon-
venient or uncomfortable, the same consequences should not en-
sue. It would be so if the landlord were to maintain a house of ill
fame adjoining or opposite to, or in the same street with the
demised premises; if he were to set up a noisy or noxious manu-
factory near the tenements he had let; or if the landlord should
happen to have the plague of a scolding wife under the same roof
with his tenant, the tenant might feel himself authorized to leave
the premises, and claim an exoneration from the payment of
rent.26
2. Trend Toward Liberalization of the Doctrine
After the foundation of the doctrine of constructive eviction had
been firmly established, the courts began gradually to extend its ap-
plication. Thus, while in the early cases affirmative acts of the landlord
were generally required to constitute a constructive eviction, more
recent cases have held that mere nonfeasance will suffice.27 Similarly,
courts no longer adhere to the rigid requirement that the acts of the
landlord be committed with the intent to compel the tenant to aban-
don the property or to deprive him of the beneficial enjoyment there-
of. The usual approach of modem courts is that "the question of in-
tention is coupled with the presumption that a landlord intends the
natural and probable consequences of his acts."2 And, in the words of
Williston, "if the landlord's acts necessarily deprive the tenant per-
manently or for a substantial time of the enjoyment of the property,
it can hardly be material with what intention the landlord acts." 29
In the early cases, the application of the doctrine of constructive
eviction was generally limited to those situations in which the conduct
of the landlord had rendered the premises uninhabitable, and even
26. Id. at 739 (dissenting opinion).
27. See, e.g., Westland Housing Corp. v. Scott, 312 Mass. 375, 44 N.E.2d 959 (1942),
noted in 13 BAYLOR L. Rv. 62, 64 (1961).
28. Pierce v. Nash, 126 Cal. App. 2d 606, 613, 272 P. 2d 938, 943 (1954).
29. 6 WmLttsToN, CoNTRAcrs, § 891, 644-645 (3d ed. 1962).
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today it is universally held that the tenant may not escape rent liability
by abandoning the premises because of minor inconveniences or defects
readily remedied by an action for damages.80 Gradually, however,
courts began to listen sympathetically to arguments that the tenant
should be able to claim a constructive eviction when the premises are
not necessarily uninhabitable, but are worthless, through the fault of
the landlord, for the particular purposes for which they were rented.
This change in the attitude of the courts is reflected by an early Michi-
gan decision.31 The lessors were the owners of a building in which they
operated a furniture store. A portion of the salesroom of the store was
leased by the tenant for use as a music store. The lease was to run for
a term of ten years. After several years, the lessors closed their furniture
store and leased the portion of the salesroom formerly occupied by
them for use as a meat market. The tenant sought to enjoin the opera-
tion of the meat market on the ground that it detracted from his music
business. The plight of the tenant apparently struck a most responsive
chord, as the court stated:
There goes with every rental of premises the right of beneficial
enjoyment by the tenant for the purpose for which the premises
are rented, at least to the extent disclosed to the lessor at the mak-
ing of the lease....
Plaintiff deals in musical instruments, inclusive of Victrolas
and records, and it is well known that purchasers desire a demon-
stration. A selection from Chopin, on a Victrola, played to the
accompaniment of a cleaver cracking bones on a butcher's block,
might not detract from the sale of meat, but would seriously in-
terfere with the music business. No music dealer, with sense,
would expect to be able to carry on his business in a butcher's
shop. The carcass of a hog, hung by the heels, with opened body
and bloody snout, may not look out of place in a butcher's shop,
but wholly out of place and repulsive in the same room with a
music store.3 2
The repudiation of uninhabitability as the only basis of constructive
eviction was clearly reflected in the Missouri case of O'Neill v. Man-
get.33 The landlord had torn down a sign which the tenant had placed
over a window of the demised premises for advertising purposes. While
this act appears inconsequential in terms of habitability, the court held
30. See, e.g., Masser v. London Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Leo v.
Santagada, 45 Misc. 2d 309, 256 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Newburgh City Ct. 1964).
31. Grinnell Bros. v. Asiuliewicz, 241 Mich. 186, 216 N.W. 388 (1927).
32. Id. at 188, 189, 216 N.W. at 388-389.
33. 44 Mo. App. 279 (1891).
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it constituted a constructive eviction since the tenant had leased the
premises for business purposes known to the landlord.
Today it appears that a majority of jurisdictions recognize that con-
structive eviction may occur when the conduct of the landlord causes
the premises to become uninhabitable or unfit for the particular pur-
pose for which they were leased.3 4 However, a recent New York case
3 5
involving quite unusual facts, appears to reach a different result. The
tenant, a publisher of a magazine devoted to the presentation of women
in "various forms of undress," was forced to abandon the leased build-
ing when the landlord refused to supply sufficient heat during hours
when the tenant's employees were scantily attired. While there was no
express covenant in the lease requiring the landlord to furnish more
heat during these hours, these times were specified in the lease. The
tenant argued that, because the landlord knew the purpose for which
the tenant rented the building, failure to provide the needed warmth
constituted a constructive eviction. The court was both sympathetic,
Although sympathy may be in order for a model whose employ-
ment demands that she pose without the usual accouterments which
help the body to retain heat, such hardship does not warrant the
aid of the court to impose an obligation on the landlord which
otherwise would not exist.
and poetic,
Poor naked wretches, whereso'ever you are, That bide the pelting
of this pitiless storm, How shall your chemiseless pelts and pink
rumps by legal writ and judicial fiat be warmed? (King Lear, Act
III, Scene 4)
but its passion lay with the landlord,
At bar, the friction of heat is generated only by nonpayment of
rent. Landlord did not undertake to supply or maintain a degree
of heat sufficient to negative what is commonly referred to as
"goose bumps" for nude professional models.36
The wit of the court is appreciated, but its decision cannot be ap-
34. See, e.g., Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Invest. Corp., 143 So. 2d 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962); Overstreet v. Rhodes, 212 Ga. 521, 93 S.E.2d 715 (1956); Clark v. Sapp, 47 Ga.
App. 91, 169 S.E. 692 (1933); Lynder v. S.S. Kresge Co., 329 Mich. 359, 45 N.W.2d 319
(1951); Banister Real Estate Co. v. Edwards, 282 S.W. 138 (Mo. Ct. App. 1926); Teeter
v. Mid-West Enterprise Co., 174 Okla. 644, 52 P.2d 810 (1935).
35. Fusion Arts, Inc. v. Sampson Publishing 9- Dist. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 440, 248 N.Y.S.2d
383 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1964).
36. Id. at 442, 248 N.Y.S.2d 385.
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plauded. The landlord did not expressly covenant to provide more
than a normal amount of heat during photographing hours, yet so long
as he was aware of the purpose for which the premises were being
leased, it would seem that the implied intention of the parties would
not be that a cold-blooded landlord should be able to thwart the ful-
fillment of that purpose by stingily stoking a furnace solely within his
control. Clearly the court does not rely on the landlord's lack of knowl-
edge of the purpose of the tenant at the time when the lease terms,
namely the rent, were agreed upon, since the court asserts that "even
detailed knowledge of the specific activities to be conducted in the leased
space, if it existed, would not justify such an extension of the duties
and burdens assumed by the landlord.13 7
A further liberalizing tendency of the courts in their approach to
the doctrine of constructive eviction is reflected by recent holdings
that conditions allowed to exist in a portion of the building other
than the demised premises may give rise to a constructive eviction.38
The changing attitude of the courts is also reflected in the extent to
which some judges have gone to bring a case within the doctrine by a
liberal construction of the lease. One recent case, in which the landlord
agreed to furnish certain services to the tenant, upheld the defense of
constructive eviction, construing a clause in the lease which provided
37. Id. Neither does the court base its decision on the possession by the tenant of an
adequate remedy for damages, since in this action, the tenant countcrclaimcd for
damages, the court finding for the landlord. The principal case should be compared with
an earlier New York case in which the issue was whether in the absence of an express
covenant the landlord was obligated to furnish heat at night to a restaurant. The court
stated:
It was evidently well known to the parties that the tenant to use the premises as
a restaurant in a district where nightlife is predominant, and that it would be
necessary for the landlord to heat such a restaurant. . . .A reasonable construction
(of the lease] is that sufficient heat should be furnished to properly conduct the
restaurant.
* .. It is reasonable to assume that under all the circumstances the landlord in-
tended to heat these premises so that the tenant might successfully operate a res-
taurant, bearing in mind the location of the restaurant and the requirements of the
neighborhood.
Columbus Spa, Inc. v. Star Co., 216 App. Div. 218, 222-223, 214 N.Y.S. 653, 658 (1926).
38. See, e.g., Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967);
Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 2d 611, 34 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1963). It would
not be practical in a paper of this length to review all of the many groups of cases
where the tenant has been held to be constructively evicted. Extensive classification of
the decisions may be found in the following authorities: LEsAR, § 3.51; 1 J. RAsca,
LANDLORD AND TENANT AND SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS, §§ 882-903 (1950); 8 G. THOMPSON ON
REAL PROPERTY, § 1132 (1959 Replacement ed.).
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that "no... interruption. . . of any such 'service' shall be deemed a
constructive eviction, -39 to apply only to "excusable" interruptions. 40
3. The Abandonment Requirement
While the doctrine of constructive eviction has been stretched over
the years, the courts have steadfastly refused to budge in their attitude
towards abandonment. In an early New York case,41 the court stated:
"[W]e know of no case sustaining the doctrine that there can be a
constructive eviction, without a surrender of possession." 42 With only
few exceptions, 43 that statement might validly be made by a modern
day court.44 Most courts justify the requirement of abandonment by
reasoning that if the premises were in fact uninhabitable or unfit for
the purpose for which they were leased, the tenant would not have re-
tained possession, but would have sought premises suitable to his
needs.45 Reliance on the doctrine of constructive eviction not only re-
quires relinquishment of possession, but the tenant must do so within
a reasonable time.46
4. Partial Eviction
In one situation at common law the courts have dispensed with the
requirement of abandonment, permitting the tenant to remain in
possession of the property without liability for rent. If the landlord
actually evicts the tenant from a portion of the demised premises, the
entire rent will be suspended until the entire leased premises are re-
stored even though the tenant remains in possession of the remainder
39. Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, at 126 n.1, 163 N.E.2d
4, at 5 n.1 (1959).
40. Id. at 128, 163 N.E.2d at 6.
41. Boreel v. Lawton, 90 N.Y. 293 (1882).
42. Id. at 297.
43. See notes 88-96 and accompanying text, infra.
44. Authority for the abandonment requirement is endless. Recent cases discussing it
include: Candell v. Western Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 156 Colo. 552, 400 P.2d 909 (1965);
Richards v. Dodge, 150 So. 2d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Venters v. Reynolds, 354
S.W.2d 521 (Ky. 1961); Strupp v. Canniff, 276 Minn. 558, 150 N.W.2d 574 (1967); Baker
v. Simonds, 79 Nev. 434, 386 P.2d 86 (1963); Weiss v. I. Zapinsky, Inc., 65 NJ. Super.
551, 167 A.2d 802 (1961).
45. See, e.g., Two Rector Street Corp. v. Bein, 226 App. Div. 73, 234 N.Y.S. 409 (1929);
Chelten Ave. Bldg. Corp. v. Mayer, 316 Pa. 228, 172 A. 675 (1934).
46. The reasonableness requirement seems to be based on "waiver." See LasAR, § 3.51.
The cases dealing with what constitutes a reasonable time are collected in Annot., 91
A.L.R.2d 638 (1963).
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of the property.47 In the often-quoted words of Cordozo in the leading
case of Fifth Avenue Building Company v. Kernochan,4 the entire rent
is suspended "because the landlord is not permitted to apportion his
own wrong."49
In explaining this decision, Cordozo is very careful to point out that
in applying the partial eviction exception, and relieving the tenant
of the duty to pay rent while he remains on the premises, "we are
dealing ... with an eviction which is actual and not constructive. '"
Recent attempts to extend the partial eviction exception to construc-
tive eviction situations will be dealt with in a subsequent section of this
note.
5. Damages
The lessor's breach of covenant, whether a breach of an express cov-
enant, or merely the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, entitles the
tenant to recover damages. 1 If the lessor's breach constitutes a con-
structive eviction, the tenant abandoning possession on account there-
of, the latter not only has a defense to an action for rent but may also
recover damages.52 If the tenant remains in possession, he may recover
damages for any express covenants breached by the landlord. 3 With
respect to the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, the weight of
authority holds that there can be no breach without an eviction, con-
structive or actual.54 There are, however, a substantial number of
well-reasoned cases holding to the contrary.5
II. CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION AND THE SLUM TENANT
The doctrine of constructive eviction provides little relief to the
inhabitants of the ghetto. Both because the nature of the remedy re-
quires those who seek to rely on it to act on the basis of supposed
47. See, e.g., Joiner v. Brightwell, 252 Ala. 112, 39 So.2d 414 (1949); Fifth Ave. Estates,
Inc. v. Scull, 42 Misc. 2d 1052, 249 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Nelson v. Lamb, 252
S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
48. 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917).
49. Id. at 373, 117 N.E. 580.
50. Id.
51. See LEsAR, §§ 3.50, 3.52 and cases cited therein.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Barry v. Holmesley, 24 Ariz. 375, 210 P. 318 (1922); Moe v. Sprankle, 32
Tenn. App. 33, 221 S.W.2d 712 (1948), noted in 3 VAND. L. REv. 333 (1950).
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rights, which may in fact not exist, and because having so acted, the
tenant only rarely is able to improve his position, the doctrine for the
most part has become a remedy of the rich.56 Unfortunately, it is the
poor who need it most.
A. The Abandonment Problem
1. The Risk of Determining What Constitutes Constructive Eviction
It will be remembered that, in order to rely on the defense of con-
structive eviction, the tenant must not only abandon the premises, but
he must do so within a reasonable time after the occurrence of the
acts which he alleges have forced him to leave.57 To most courts-ap-
parently blinded on this point by the glaring simplicity of their reason-
ing-the justification of such a requirement seems self-explanatory.
However, an examination of the requirement in terms of its effect on
the slum tenant reveals its deficiencies.
One of the greatest inadequacies of the doctrine of constructive
eviction is its effect of placing on the tenant the burden of determining
whether he may relinquish possession of the premises and successfully
claim that he has been constructively evicted. What acts or omissions
of the landlord will permit the tenant to abandon the premises with-
out rent liability is necessarily a question of fact to be determined by
the application of objective standards to the circumstances of each
case. So long as the tenant remains in possession there is an absolute
presumption that he has not been so deprived of the beneficial use and
enjoyment of the property as to constitute an eviction. But the street
does not run two ways; if the tenant gambles on his rights and aban-
dons the premises, there is no presumption of uninhabitability or
unfitness for use. The tenant must justify his action at the risk of being
liable for both rent without possession and damages for breach of
covenant. To the tenant who can barely afford slum housing, the
thought of seeking new lodging, while at the same time paying for the
old, must indeed be a frightful one.
2. The Risk of Determining Reasonable Time
In addition to the necessity of having to guess whether the premises
have become sufficiently uninhabitable, the tenant must also gamble
on the time factor. In determining what is a "reasonable" time, the
56. See DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc. 2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 N.Y.
City Civ. Ct. 1965), holding that lack of a doorman constituted a constructive eviction.
57, See 41-46 supra and accompanying text.
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tenant must not only decide that he has waited long enough to give
the landlord a' reasonable time to remedy the condition 8 but also
that he has not waited so long as to "waive" the defects."0 With the
help of an attorney, the tenant should be able to make a reasonably
accurate guess; without one, most slum tenants are probably unaware
even of their right to leave without paying rent no matter how unin-
habitable the premises become.
It is probable that a significant number of indigent tenants have
leased property on the basis of oral promises by their landlords to make
certain repairs. Whether he seeks to use the landlord's failure to make
these repairs as a basis for constructive eviction or as a ground for an
action for damages, the tenant will almost invariably face difficult
proof problems in court. For the indigent slum tenant, the common
law provides a meager arsenal of effective remedies against a defaulting
landlord.
3. No Place to Go
As discussed previously,60 the abandonment requirement is for the
most part based on the reasoning that, if the premises were in fact un-
inhabitable or unfit for purpose, the tenant would not have retained
possession. Therefore, so long as he is content to retain the use of
the property, he should not be able to claim it is not fit and habitable.
In the thoughtless words of one court, "[a] tenant cannot claim unin-
habitability, and at the same time continue to inhabit."0 1 The absurdity
of basing a finding of habitability on the fact of human occupancy is
best demonstrated by the descriptive account by a New York court of
the plight of a tenant and his family after partial destruction of their
leased apartment by fire:
In the halcyon days of an ample supply of housing accomoda-
tions the tenant might well have turned his back on the whole
wretched ruin and, with his wife and small children, faced reso-
lutely forward to the resumption of family life in fresher quarters,
secure from further liability to his old landlord for rent....
But if the tenant.., on surveying the wreckage of his quondam
holding made any such right about, he came face to face with a
58. See Repacz, Origin and Evolution of Constructive Eviction in The United States,
1 DEPAuLE L. REv. 69, 85 (1951).
59. According to many of the cases, the tenant has no more than a month to make
up his mind. See Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 638 (1963).
60. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
61. Two Rector Street Corp. v. Bein, 226 App. Div. 73, 76, 234 N.Y.S. 409, 412 (1929).
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housing shortage of such intensity and proportions as to consti-
tute a grave public emergency....
Thus under the duress of unalterable circumstances the tenant
had no choice, after the fire, but to lead his brood back to his
whilom apartment and, picking a path through mounds of fire-
rubbish, seek the most nearly habitable corner of this dismal,
reeking waste as at least some semblance of shelter from the less
penetrating elements. .. . With a fortitude born of desperation
the tenant and his wife made shift as best they could and as only
the homeless can. Showing a genius for improvisation and a pa-
tient endurance rivalling that of their displaced brothers and sis-
ters in the bombed-out cities of Europe, they adapted a onetime
bedroom into a whimsical sort of refuge where the family could at
least make common resort for the crudest of nightly lodging. With-
out toilet, cooking or heating facilities; without water supply,
gas or electricity, the tenant and his family made camp in this
corner of a cave. 62
The abandonment requirement renders the doctrine of constructive
eviction a hollow remedy for indigents and "offers little more than
the alternative of quitting one substandard unit for another."63
4. The Disparity of the Tenant's Bargaining Position
One justification sometimes given by the courts for strict adherence
to the abandonment requirement is that the parties were free to pro-
vide otherwise in the lease and that it is not the function of the courts
to write the parties' agreement. 64 With respect to the slum tenant, con-
tinued adherence to this notion represents complete incognizance of
the economic and educational status of the inhabitants of America's
ghettos. It is indeed possible to provide expressly in the lease that the
tenant may remain in possession of the property without rent liability
until any defects are corrected.65 But to suggest that the uneducated
and economically impotent slum dweller caught up in the phenomenon
62. Johnson v. Pemberton, 197 Misc. 739, 740-41, 97 N.Y.S.2d 153, 155 N.Y. City Civ.
Ct. 1950). In consequence of its findings, the court did not release the tenant from rent
liability but held that the rent should be reduced under the New York rent control
statute.
63. Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding Under New York's Spiegel
Law, 15 BUFFALo L. REv. 572, 577 (1966). See also 2 R. PowE.L, RFAL PROPERTY, 230[3]
(P. Rohan ed. 1967) in which Powell comments:
It has been recently suggested that the utility of the doctrine of constructive eviction
as a weapon in the hands of lessees to compel lessors to do as they have agreed has
been eliminated by the housing shortage, which practically prevents a tenant from
removing when treated badly.
64. See notes 12, 13 supra and accompanying text.
65. Cf. Williams v. Bernath, 61 Ga. App. 350, 6 S.E.2d 184 (1939).
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of supply and demand might be able to procure, independently of the
help of the law, more than the adhesion contracts presently used by
most slumlords is to reject reality. The estate of most slum tenants
consists of no more than an oral periodic tenancy, the tenant receiving
from the landlord possession and only those covenants which the law
requires, and in this regard, the law is at best very stingy.00
B. The Inadequacy of Damages
Rigid adherence to the common law requirements of constructive
eviction has frequently been justified by the courts on the basis that,
even if the tenant is not able to bring his case within its terms, he can
find protection by maintaining an action against the landlord for
damages. Unfortunately here again we find that such an action is a hol-
low remedy in the hands of the indigent.
In the first place, the slum tenant is rarely in a financial position to
prosecute a law suit, even assuming his awareness of his right to do so.
In addition, if the tenant is relying on unwritten promises by the land-
lord he will undoubtedly encounter difficult proof problems. Even if
the tenant should prevail in such an action, his recovery would be negli-
gible,67 and he still would not have secured adequate housing, his most
pressing need. A further limitation on the damage remedy is that it
subjects the tenant-in many cases owning no more than a fragile
periodic tenancy-to the revenge of the landlord in the form of retalia-
tory eviction,68 a most frightful thought indeed to a person who has
known the horrors of a housing shortage.
66. Note, Rent Withholding-A Proposal for Legislation in Ohio, 18 Was. Ras. L. REV.
1705, 1707-1708 (1967).
67. While there is some conflict as to the proper measure of damages recoverable by
the tenant for breach of an express repair covenant, the usual rule is the difference
between the rental value of the premises as they actually are and their value if the repairs
had been made. See, e.g., Johns v. Hudson, 182 Ark. 1162, 34 S.W.2d 760 (1931); Noble v.
Tweedy, 90 Cal. App. 2d 738, 203 P.2d 778 (1949); Daniels v. Cohen, 249 Mass. 362, 144
N.E. 237 (1924). See also Annot., 28 A.L.R2d 446, 480-492 (1953). As has been pointed
out previously the cost of slum housing is not significantly less than modern housing.
See note 2 supra. And as was noted in a student work, "If the dwelling is run down and
in a slum neighborhood, the difference in the value of the premises with and without
hot water ... may not be very great." Note, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of
Substandard Housing, 53 CAuiF. L. REV. 304, 313 n.41 (1965).
68. For a recent District of Columbia case holding that a landlord has no legal right
to evict a tenant in retaliation for the tenant's report of housing code violations to the
authorities, see Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See generally Note,
Retaliatory Evictions and the Reporting of Housing Code Violations in the District of
Columbia, 36 GEo. WAsH. L. R.v. 190 (1967); Comment, Landlord and Tenant-Retalia-
tory Eviction, 3 HAv. Crv. Ls.-Civ. RIGHTS L. REv. 193 (1967); Note, Retaliatory Eviction
-Is California Lagging Behind?, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 700 (1967).
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III. LEGISLATIVE INNOVATION
While several impatient and imaginative judges have launched sorties
on some of the more antiquated features of the law of landlord and
tenant, it is apparent that the modifications needed in this area of the
law to help relieve the slum tenants of the burdens of their deplorable
living conditions can only be accomplished by a full scale assault by
our legislatures. To date, this assault has met with only mixed success.
A. Housing Codes
Basically, it is the purpose of housing codes to require property
owners to comply with minimum housing standards covering such
areas as lighting, ventilation, toilet facilities, plumbing, and fire escape
facilities. In addition, many codes have provisions providing for the
control of vermin, overcrowding, and other unsanitary conditions. 69
Housing codes are most commonly enforced by the use of criminal
sanctions in the form of fines or prison sentences.70 Some codes, how-
ever, provide for the vacation of non-conforming buildings. 71
The codes have undoubtedly helped to improve the standard of
American housing. Yet while they have, perhaps, slowed the spiralling
forces of urban deterioration, they have not stopped their advance, and
in the words of one observer, "the codes are not doing the job that
was expected of them."72 Perhaps the inadequaicies of the codes were
best summarized by President Johnson's Riot Commission:
Thousands of landlords in disadvantaged neighborhoods openly
violate building codes with impunity, thereby providing a con-
stant demonstration of flagrant discrimination by legal authori-
ties. A high proportion of residential and other structures con-
tain numerous violations of building and housing codes. Refusal
to remedy these violations is a criminal offense, one which can
have serious effects upon the victims living in these structures. Yet
in most cities, few building code violations in these areas are ever
corrected, even when tenants complain directly to municipal
building departments.
69. See Note, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1115, 1116 (1956).
70. See, eg., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 304 (McKinney Supp. 1968). See generally
Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
1254 (1966); Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66
COLutM. L. REv. 275 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L.
Rlv. 801 (1965).
71. See Note, 69 HAv. L. REv. 1115 (1956).
72. Note, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF.
L. Rsv. 304, 316 (1965).
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There are economic reasons why these codes are not rigorously
enforced. Bringing many old structures up to code standards and
maintaining them at that level often would require owners to
raise rents far above the ability of local residents to pay. In New
York City, rigorous code enforcement has already caused owners to
board up and abandon over 2,500 buildings rather than incur the
expense of repairing them. Nevertheless, open violation of codes
is a constant source of distress to low-income tenants and creates
serious hazards to health and safety in disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods.73
Housing codes and the difficulties and consequences of their enforce-
ment are complex phenomena and cannot be dealt with in depth in
this note. It is clear that legislatures have not been satisfied with the
results accomplished by the criminal sanction; several of the more
imaginative states, consequently, have experimented with new methods
of code enforcement.
B. Repair and Deduct Laws
In a substantial number of states, upon breach by the landlord of
an express promise to repair, the tenant is permitted to make the
necessary repairs and deduct the expense therefor from the rent.7 4
Adopting and extending this approach, a few states have enacted "re-
pair and deduct" laws, by which the tenant is authorized to make cer-
tain repairs refused to be made by the landlord and deduct the cost
from the rent.75 For the most part, these statutes have been unsuccess-
ful. Their inadequacies are reflected by the Montana statute. In Mon-
tana, lessors are obligated, in the absence of an agreement to the con-
trary, to put demised premises into a condition fit for human
occupation.76 When the lessor neglects to perform this duty, Montana
permits the tenant to make the repairs himself, provided that "the
cost of such repairs do not require an expenditure greater than one
month's rent .... "77 The incongruity of the statute is, of course, that
the condition of the premises which permit the tenant to make repairs
could scarcely be remedied by the spending of one month's rent.76 In
73. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DisoRDERs 259 (1968).
74. See, e.g., Childress v. Tyson, 200 Ark. 1129, 143 S.W.2d 45 (1940); Masser v. London
Operating Co., 106 Fla. 474, 145 So. 79 (1932); Johns v. Gibson, 60 Ga. App. 585, 4 S.E.2d
480 (1939); Loy v. Sparks, 304 Ill. App. 35, 25 N.E.2d 893 (1940).
75. See, e.g., CAL. Cry. CODE §§ 1941-42 (Deering 1960); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 42-
201, -202 (1947); OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, §§ 31-32 (1961); S.D. CODE §§ 38.0409, .0410 (1989).
76. MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. 42-201 (1947).
77. MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. 42-202 (1947).
78. See, Note, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53
CALF. L. REV. 304, 312 (1965).
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addition, the statute is only operative "in the absence of agreement
to the contrary." Nothing, therefore, prevents the landlord from avoid-
ing the statute by shifting the burden to repair to the tenant by a
standard adhesion contract.
C. Receivership
The most significant receivership law is the New York statute,79
which permits the City of New York to repair conditions that constitute
a serious menace to the health and safety of tenants which the landlord,
after notice, has refused to make. The City recovers its expenses di-
rectly from the tenant's rents, the receiver having a prior lien thereon.80
The problem with the receivership laws is not hard to find-MONEY. It
is obvious that municipalities cannot afford to repair and rehabilitate
all of the dilapidated buildings they might find, and while theoretically
the cities are to be reimbursed for any repairs made, the reimbursement
would be a slow process and the initial outlay of capital which would
be needed for extensive repairs has not been made available. Another
obstacle to the effectiveness of these statutes is time; proceedings under
the New York statute take up to a year."'
D. Rent Withholding
One of the most controversial responses to the inadequacies of hous-
ing codes-and to the ineffectiveness of the doctrine of constructive
eviction-has been the enactment of rent withholding statutes. These
statutes have taken various forms. New York, once again, has taken the
lead as evidenced by the following legislation:8 2 section 302-a of the
Multiple Dwelling Law provides for the withholding of rent by the
tenant when the landlord, after notice, refuses to correct defects which
constitute "a serious threat to the life, health or safety" of the tenants;8 3
section 755 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law pro-
vides that when the condition of the premises is such as to constitute a
constructive eviction, the tenant, until repairs are made, may pay his
79. NY. MULT. D%=u.. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
80. Id. at § 309(5)(d)(1). The constitutionality of this part of the statute has been
upheld by the New York Court of Appeals in In re Department of Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d
291, 200 NE.2d 342, 14 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964).
81. See Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARV. L. Rav. 801 (1965).
82. See generally Note, Rent Strike Legislation-New York's Solution to Landlord-
Tenant Conflicts, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. Rrv. 253 (1966).
83, N.Y. MuLT. Dwnz.. LAw § 302-a(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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rent into the court, the court staying any proceeding against the tenant
for nonpaymen of rent; 4 sections 769-82 of the Real Property Ac-
tions Law provides that one-third or more of the tenants of a multiple
dwelling in New York City may petition to have their rent payments
deposited into court to remedy conditions "dangerous to life, health, or
safety."8' 5 In addition, section 143-b of the Social Welfare Law permits
rent withholding by the Department of Welfare and will be discussed
below."6
Section 755 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law,s7
first enacted in 1939 has been the most extensively litigated of the New
York statutes. Basically, it provides that if leased premises are in viola-
tion of housing code requirements so as to constructively evict the
tenant from a portion of the" premises occupied by him, the tenant may
deposit his rent with the court and be protected from any action by
the landlord based on nonpayment of rent. The rent is to be released
to the landlord only after he has removed the code violations. It should
be noted that this statute does not modify the common law doctrine of
constructive eviction in that while the tenant remains in possession
of the premises he must pay rent. The purpose of the statute is to
induce the landlord to make repairs by keeping the rents from him so
long as he fails to do so. Perhaps the most vehement objection to sec-
tion 755 is the continued liability of the tenant for rent. Critics argue
that once the premises are found to be defective or in a dangerous or
unhealthy condition this liability should cease until the landlord makes
the required repairs. In the recent case of Gombo v. Martise,s8 an un-
successful attempt was made to remedy this situation. The tenants,
while remaining in possession of the property, paid their rents into the
court after city officials had discovered twenty-nine code violations on
the premises. The landlord brought an action against the tenants seek-
ing to recover the rents. Not content with merely withholding the rent
from the landlord under section 755, Judge Moritt upon finding that
the condition of the premises was "a menace to life, limb and health,"
and constituted a partial eviction, held that the rent should be returned
in toto to the tenants and that they should not have to pay rent to the
84. N.Y. REsAL PfioP. ACTIONS § 755 (McKinney 1963).
85. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 769-82 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
86. N.Y. Soc. WE=FARE LAw § 143-b (McKinney 1966).
87. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS § 755 (McKinney 1963).
88. 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1964), rev'd per curiam, 44
Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. Div. 1964).
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court or the landlord until the repairs were made.89 On appeal, the
Gombo case was reversed per curiam, the appellate court holding that
the facts did not warrant the finding of an actual eviction and that no
constructive eviction can occur while the tenants remain in possession
of the premises."" Despite its reversal, the significance of Judge Moritt's
decision should not be overlooked.
In reaching his decision, Moritt relied exclusively, with respect to
case law, on the opinion by Cordozo in Fifth Avenue Building Com-
pany v. Kernochan9l and especially on the statement therein that "if
such an eviction, though partial only, is the act of the landlord, it
suspends the entire rent because the landlord is not permitted to ap-
portion his own wrong. ' 92 To rely exclusively on Fifth Avenue was,
perhaps, a fatal mistake. On its facts, that case was readily distinguish-
able from Gombo since as previously mentioned,93 Cordozo had ex-
pressly confined his holding to cases of actual and not constructive
eviction. 94
Since the Fifth Avenue decision, there have been two New York
cases, Johnson v. Pemberton95 and Majen Realty Corporation v. Glot-
zen96 which have extended the partial eviction exception to include
partial constructive eviction, but only so far as abating the rent in
proportion to the degree of diminished use and enjoyment by the
tenant. Thus, while in these cases the tenant was not relieved of his
duty to pay rent, he was permitted to pay less rent. Both of these cases
represent a significant step from Fifth Avenue. While the next logical
step would appear to be the one taken by Judge Moritt in Gombo, it
was, perhaps, unwise to try to take it by stepping over Johnson and
Majen.
Following New York's lead, in 1966 Massachusetts enacted a rent
withholding statute which though similar to section 755, replaces the
constructive eviction test of that statute with the provision that the
violation must "endanger or materially impair the health or safety of
persons occupying the premises." 97
89. Gombo v. Martise, 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1964).
90. Combo v. Martise, 44 Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (App. Div. 1964).
91. 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917). See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
92. Id. at 373, 117 N.E. at 580.
93. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
94. Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917).
95. 97 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1950). See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
96. 61 N.Y.S.2d 195 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1946).
97. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 239, § 8A (Supp. 1967) (emphasis added).
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A recently enacted Pennsylvania statute provides that when an official
agency "certifies a dwelling as unfit for human habitation, the duty of
any tenant of such dwelling to pay, and the right of the landlord to
collect rent shall be suspended without affecting any other terms or
conditions of the landlord-tenant relationship .. ."8 The statute fur-
ther provides that during the period of suspension the rent is paid into
an escrow account to be paid to the landlord when the dwelling is
rendered fit for habitation. If the repairs are not made within six
months, the tenant may withdraw the rent and remain in possession
free from the threat of eviction or, in the alternative, the rent paid into
escrow may be used to make the needed repairs.9
The District of Columbia has adopted a significantly different ap-
proach to the problem of housing code violations and leased property.
Under the District of Columbia Housing Regulations,'"0 the landlord
is prohibited from renting property which is not in a clean, safe, sani-
tary and repaired condition. Similarly, tenants are prohibited from
occupying premises which are not in such condition. This statute was
applied in the recent case of Brown v. Southall Realty Company.10'
Property was leased to the tenant in an unsafe and unsanitary condi-
tion. Upon the tenant's failure to pay rent the landlord sued for re-
covery thereof. The tenant, having since abandoned the property, de-
fended on the basis of the statute, claiming that the lease agreement
was void and that the landlord had no rights thereunder. The court
sustained the defense.
Despite the importance which has been ascribed to the Brown case,1 02
it would appear that the decision has only slightly improved the posi-
tion of the slum tenant in the District of Columbia. By its decision,
the court prevented the landlord from obtaining rent from the letting
of uninhabitable dwellings. Yet, by declaring the lease illegal and void,
it follows that there is no longer a landlord-tenant relationship, and
the landlord would be able to evict the tenant from his property, the
tenant having no more than an estate at sufferance. The effect of this
statute would undoubtedly cause most slum tenants to think twice be-
fore reporting code violations to municipal authorities if they could
be evicted for doing so. Recognizing this problem the Court of Appeals
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1967).
99. Id.
100. HOUSING REGULATIONS OF THE DiSmiTr OF COLUMBIA §§ 2304, 2501 (1956).
101. 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
102. See LAW IN AcTION, Feb., 1968, at 1.
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for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently held retaliatory evic-
tion illegal within the District.103
E. The Spiegel Law
Perhaps the most controversial of the new rent withholding laws is
New York's section 143-b of the Social Welfare Law, popularly known
as the Spiegel Law.10 4 This legislation provides that the Department of
Welfare may make direct payments of rent to the landlords of welfare
recipients and that such payments be withheld from the landlord when
violations of housing standards "dangerous, hazardous or detrimental
to life or health" exist on the premises. The statute further provides
for the stay of any action brought by the landlord against the tenant
for nonpayment of rent during the time when the rent is being with-
held.
Underlying the Spiegel Law is the simple logic that slumlords who
maintain their property in violation of state law should not be sup-
ported by state funds. While the application of the statute is limited to
dwellings in which welfare recipients reside, the number of people
receiving welfare in our major cities is substantial, and it is the build-
ings in which they live that most desperately are in need of repair.
The constitutionality of the Spiegel Law has been attacked on both
due process and equal protection grounds. While the validity of the
statute has been upheld in lower New York decisions,10 5 it was only
recently tested by the New York Court of Appeals in Farrell v. Drew.00
In that case, a New York building inspector discovered that a door in
the landlord's building which led to the apartment of a tenant not on
welfare did not close properly and thus was in violation of the building
code. The Department of Welfare abated all rent payments to the land-
lord since there were three welfare recipients living in the building. In
an action brought by the landlord to evict the three tenants for non-
payment of rent, the lower court held for the tenants, finding that the
defective door was within the terms of the Spiegel Law in that it was
103. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
104. N.Y. Soc. W..FARE LAw § 143-b (McKinney 1966).
105. See Milchman v. Rivera, 39 Misc. 2d 347, 240 N.Y.S.2d 859 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1963), appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d 1123, 196 N.E2d 555, 247 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1964); Schaeffer
v. Montes, 37 Misc. 2d 722, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1962). But see Trozze
v. Drooney, 35 Misc. 2d 1060, 232 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Binghampton City Ct. 1962).
106. 19 N.Y.2d 486, 227 N.E.2d 824, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967), noted in 13 ViLL. L. REv.
206. See also Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding Under New York's
Spiegel Law, 15 Bu1rrALo L. REv. 572 (1966).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
hazardous to life and health. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that the statute was neither violative of equal protection nor due
process of the law.10 7
In 1965, the Illinois legislature enacted a statute patterned after the
Spiegel Law.-08 While the Illinois law has several variations in its terms,
the principle on which the statute is based is the same as that underly-
ing the Spiegel Law. One significant difference between the two statutes
is that the Illinois law provides for intervention by the Department of
Buildings in any action by the landlord against the welfare tenants for
nonpayment of rent. In New York, the Department could only appear
by petitioning the court as amicus curiae.10 9
CONCLUSION
Recent legislation represents an important awareness of the ineffec-
tiveness of common law remedies afforded the slum tenant. Such laws
are also a legislative acknowledgement of the failure of criminal sanc-
tions to induce compliance with housing codes. Satisfactory renova-
tion of our big city slums will require huge amounts of capital, and
modification of the landlord-tenant law in this country cannot by itself
provide the impetus needed. A large step will have been taken, how-
ever, when the law provides indigent tenants with the means to force
slumlords to comply with at least the health and safety provisions of
modem housing codes.
It is submitted that the doctrine of constructive eviction, so long
as the increasing pressures of our population explosion render ade-
quate housing a comparative scarcity, offers little to the slum tenant
and is insufficient to coerce the landlord to make needed repairs. It is
further submitted that rent withholding statutes, such as those dis-
cussed above, represent a step in the right direction. As courts and legis-
latures iron out the deficiencies of these initial statutes, it is hoped that
more states will confront the need to modernize the law of landlord
and tenant and especially that area of the law which has for years con-
tributed to the hardships of the indigent tenant.
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